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Abstract—Private computation is a generalization of private
information retrieval, in which a user is able to compute a
function on a distributed dataset without revealing the identity
of that function to the servers. In this paper it is shown that
Lagrange encoding, a powerful technique for encoding Reed-
Solomon codes, enables private computation in many cases of
interest. In particular, we present a scheme that enables private
computation of polynomials of any degree on Lagrange encoded
data, while being robust to Byzantine and straggling servers,
and to servers colluding to attempt to deduce the identities of the
functions to be evaluated. Moreover, incorporating ideas from the
well-known Shamir secret sharing scheme allows the data itself to
be concealed from the servers as well. Our results extend private
computation to high degree polynomials and to data-privacy, and
reveal a tight connection between private computation and coded
computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) refers to the process of
downloading a file from a database, without revealing to the
database which file is being downloaded. PIR was originally
introduced in the seminal work [4] from the perspective of
Computer Science, where the goal is to construct PIR scheme
with minimal communication cost. Much work has been done
on PIR from this point of view, both under information-
theoretic constraints [30] and computational ones [19], of
which we also briefly mention [10, 29].
Recently, due to rising interest in large scale distributed stor-
age systems and emerging quantum attacks on computationally
secure protocols, PIR has experienced a flurry of research
from the Information Theory community. In the Information-
Theoretic formulation of the PIR problem, the primary perfor-
mance metric of a PIR scheme is the download rate, which
refers to the amount of downloaded bits per one information
bit. The capacity of PIR, given a specific system setup, is the
maximum possible download rate. Commonly, one assumes
that files of length K are distributed over N different servers
using an [N,K] Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) storage
code, and every T out of these N servers can collude to try to
deduce the identity of the file being downloaded. The capacity
of several variations on the PIR problem is now known, for
example for K = T = 1 by [23], for K = 1 and T ≥ 1
by [24], and for K ≥ 1 and T = 1 by [2]. Additional
interesting and practically relevant variants on PIR appear
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when one accounts for unreliability of the servers, whether
they be unresponsive, malicious, or curious as to the contents
of the data they are storing. Variants along these lines have
been studied and capacity expressions have been derived in
[3, 11, 24].
Many open questions about PIR remain, for example the
PIR capacity is unknown when K,T > 1, that is, when
a non-trivial storage code is used and we have non-trivial
server collusion; less is known when K,T > 1 and we
try to account for unreliable servers. Given the difficulty of
proving optimality in such generality, one is often content
with achieving the more modest goal of constructing PIR
schemes with large download rate and ignoring questions of
capacity. Algebraic constructions of PIR schemes for coded
data with colluding servers appeared in [8, 26], which were
then generalized in [27] to account for unresponsive and
Byzantine servers. Additional work along these lines has been
done in [9, 13] for non-MDS storage codes. These schemes
generally fall under the umbrella of “one-shot schemes”, a
term recently christened in [6], where it was also shown how
to lift such schemes to obtain schemes which achieve capacity
in certain cases. Reed-Solomon and Reed-Muller codes have
been especially useful in such constructions, because of their
compatibility with the star product between two linear codes
(see Section II-C).
B. Private Computation
Private Computation (PC) is a generalization of PIR wherein
the user wants to not just privately download a file from
the database, but privately compute an arbitrary function
of it. In PC, privacy refers to hiding the identity of the
function to be computed. One recovers the PIR problem by
specifying to functions given by coordinate projections. The
principal performance metric for PC protocols is the PC-rate
(or simply, rate), which is the ratio between the number of
desired function evaluations and the total number of function
evaluations downloaded.
For functions which are linear combinations of the files,
PC was studied in [16, 25] for uncoded databases, and in
[17, 18] for coded databases. The case of non-linear functions,
and especially polynomial functions of degree larger than one,
was studied by the second author of the current work in [12],
where a PC scheme was constructed for polynomial functions
on systematically coded databases.
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2C. Coded Computation
The term Coded Computation (CC) broadly refers to a
family of techniques in which redundancy is added to datasets,
in order to alleviate various issues that arise in distributed
computations. Motivated by recent applications in machine
learning, studies in Coded Computation have focused, e.g.,
on accelerating distributed tasks, combating malicious inter-
ventions, providing various forms of privacy, alleviating the
communication load in iterative algorithms, and more.
The study of this topic has been highly prolific in recent
years, and works on the topic have mostly been task-specific.
Typical tasks of interest include matrix multiplication [7, 31],
accelerating gradient descent algorithms [15, 20, 28], commu-
nication reduction [14], and data shuffling [1, 5]. Yet, coded
computing of general polynomials has been addressed only
recently in [32], which is tightly connected to our results.
In [32] it was shown that coding the data by using the well-
known Lagrange polynomials can amend issues of resiliency,
security, and privacy in many tasks of interest.
D. Current Contributions
We present a Private Computation scheme for the evaluation
of degree G polynomials on K data vectors xk ∈ FMq ,
encoded using an [N,K+E] Reed-Solomon code, which hides
the identity of the polynomials to be computed from any T
colluding servers, and hides the contents of the data vectors
xk from any E colluding servers. The scheme is robust against
any P stragglers and any A adversaries, and has PC rate
R =
N − (G(K + E − 1) + T + P + 2A)
N
·
K
G(K + E − 1) + 1 , (1)
which clearly requires that N > (G(K+E−1)+T+P+2A).
We provide a non-trivial example which illustrates the scheme
construction. Lastly, we propose an alternative scheme in the
case that P = A = E = 0, which employs systematic data
encoding and achieves a rate of
R =
min{N − (G(K − 1) + T ),K}
N
.
This second scheme construction first appeared in [12]. We
provide some basic analysis as to the relative performance of
the two schemes.
The scheme construction borrows ideas from Coded Com-
putation, especially those of [32]. Data storage is realized
by evaluating interpolating polynomials, which allows the
evaluation of polynomials on encoded data to be viewed as
the evaluation of a single variable polynomial. This single-
variable polynomial is the composition of two polynomial
functions of known degree, and its degree can therefore be
calculated explicitly and serves as crucial knowledge for the
scheme construction and rate calculation.
Our techniques are applicable in many real-world scenarios.
Beyond direct applications in distributed computations over
finite fields, such as large scale matrix multiplication, one
can also apply our techniques in real-number scenarios with
minor additional effort, by quantization and embedding of
real values into a large enough finite field. Such quantization
techniques were employed in machine learning scenarios, e.g.,
in distributed linear regression in [32], and in distributed
logistic regression in [22].
E. Comparison with Previous Work
The scheme construction presented here also generalizes
some ideas from [27] to deal with non-linear functions and
data privacy. In the case of E = 0 and G = 1 the current
scheme achieves a rate of
R =
N − (K + T + P + 2A− 1)
N
. (2)
If the functions to be computed are all distinct coordinate
projections, then we reduce to the case of the PIR problem,
and the rate of (2) matches that of [27]. If one further assumes
that P = A = 0, one achieves a rate of
R =
N − (K + T − 1)
N
(3)
which is that of [8]. The rate (3) is also the asymptotic rate
(as the number of files M →∞) of [18] when T = 1, which
studies linear computations of coded databases. In all cases
where E = 0 and the PIR or PC capacity C is known, the
current scheme achieves the asymptotic capacity as the number
of files grows, that is, R = limM→∞ C.
The capacity for the case E > 0 is subtler. The case of K =
1, G = 1, P = A = 0 is that of the recent work [11], which
studies the PIR problem under the constraints of T -function
privacy and E-data privacy, for storage systems in which every
server stores an amount of data which is comparable to the
entire dataset. In [11], the authors show that
lim
M→∞
C =
{
N−(E+T )
N if N > E + T
0 if N ≤ E + T
where C is the PIR capacity of this setting, and use a technique
they deem Cross Subspace Alignment to construct an explicit
scheme which achieves the above rate. The rate R we achieve
in this scenario is
R =
N − (E + T )
N
· 1
E + 1
whenever N > E + T , which is strictly worse than that of
[11] when E > 0. This essentially stems from the fact that
it is not clear how to align the noise terms arising from the
function-privacy randomness and data-privacy randomness as
in [11] for non-linear functions. Thus our PC scheme leaves
room for improvement in the case of non-trivial data privacy.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Throughout the current paper, we adopt the following
notation. For a given integer N , define [N ] to be the set
{1, 2, . . . , N} of the first N natural numbers. We use low-
ercase letters a, b, c, . . . for scalars or indexing variables, and
uppercase letters A,B,C, . . . for system parameters, such as
the number of servers, dimension of the storage code, etc.
Boldface lowercase letters a,b, c, . . . are reserved for vectors,
3and boldface uppercase letters A,B,C, . . . for matrices. Cal-
ligraphic letters A,B, C, . . . are used to denote sets, including
linear codes. The symbol Fq is used to denote the finite field
of cardinality q. Lowercase Greek letters such as φ, ψ, ρ, . . .
will generally be used to denote functions, and φ ◦ ψ denotes
the composition of φ and ψ, that is, (φ ◦ ψ)(x) = φ(ψ(x)).
An [N,K,D]q code C is a linear code over Fq with length
N , dimension K, and minimum distance D. We will often
omit the D or q if they are unimportant or clear from context.
Recall that C is MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) if D =
N −K + 1.
We let PM,G denote the set of all polynomials with coeffi-
cients in Fq in M variables with total degree at most G, that
is,
PM,G = {φ ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , XM ] : deg(φ) ≤ G}.
Note that PM,G is a finite-dimensional vector space over Fq
and therefore supports a uniform distribution. The parameter
M will be of less interest to us in general and hence we will
often write PG for PM,G.
B. Reed-Solomon Codes
Given parameters N , K, and q ≥ N , we construct the
[N,K] Reed-Solomon code over Fq as follows. Let α =
(α1, . . . , αN ) be N distinct elements of Fq , and let
Fq[z]<K = {φ ∈ Fq[z] : deg(φ) ≤ K − 1}
We define the Reed-Solomon code RSK(α) associated with
this data to be the image of the evaluation map
ev : Fq[z]<K → FNq , ev(φ) = (φ(α1), . . . , φ(αN ))
It is a classical result that RSK(α) is an MDS code.
We will be particularly interested in the encoding of Reed-
Solomon codes. If one chooses a basis φ1, . . . , φK of the
vector space Fq[z]<K , then a generator matrix (and therefore
an encoding map) is given by
G =

φ1(α1) φ1(α2) · · · φ1(αN )
φ2(α1) φ2(α2) · · · φ2(αN )
...
...
. . .
...
φK(α1) φK(α2) · · · φK(αN )
 .
The following two choices of generator matrices will be the
most important for our purposes.
1) Canonical Encoding: The basis 1, z, . . . , zK−1 of
Fq[X]<K gives rise to the Vandermonde generator matrix
G =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αN
...
...
. . .
...
αK−11 α
K−1
2 · · · αK−1N

Another way to view this encoding map is to map a mes-
sage a = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ FK−1q to the polynomial φa =∑K−1
i=0 ai+1z
i. The codeword is then (φa(α1), . . . , φa(αN )) =
aG.
2) Lagrange Encoding: [32] In this case we choose a basis
of Fq[z]<K to consist of interpolating polynomials. More
specifically, choose some β = (β1, . . . , βK) consisting of
distinct βk ∈ Fq . If a = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ FKq is a message
vector, define ua,β ∈ Fq[z]<K by the property ua,β(βk) = ak
for all k = 1, . . . ,K. The Lagrange Interpolation formula
guarantees the existence of ua,β, and the uniqueness is a
consequence of the degree restriction.
A generator matrix corresponding to this encoding map is
given by
G = G(α,β) ,
∏
j∈[K]\{1}
βj − α1
βj − β1 · · ·
∏
j∈[K]\{1}
βj − αN
βj − β1∏
j∈[K]\{2}
βj − α1
βj − β2 · · ·
∏
j∈[K]\{2}
βj − αN
βj − β2
...
...
. . .
...∏
j∈[K]\{K}
βj − α1
βj − βK · · ·
∏
j∈[K]\{K}
βj − αN
βj − βK

, (4)
where we omit the notation α,β when clear from context.
If one defines βk = αk for k = 1, . . . ,K, then the above
matrix G is in systematic form. The fact that ImG(α,β) ,
{aG(α,β)|a ∈ FKq } equals RSK(α) for every β might not
be readily seen, but is easily proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For every set α ⊆ Fq of size N , and every set β ⊆
Fq of size K, we have that ImG(α,β) = RSK(α).
Proof. Let G = G(α,β). First, observe that aG = ev(ua,β)
for every a ∈ FKq . This readily implies the inclusion ImG ⊆
RSK(α), since RSK(α) includes all evaluations at α of
all univariate polynomials of degree at most K − 1, one of
which is ua,β. To prove the converse inclusion, let ev(f) ∈
RSK(α), and define y = (f(β1), . . . , f(βK)). Since the
polynomial uy,β agrees with the polynomial f on {βi}Ki=1,
and since the degrees of both f and uy.β are at most K−1, if
follows that f = uy,β, which implies that ev(uy,β) = ev(f),
and hence ev(f) ∈ ImG.
C. Star Products
Let x = (x1, . . . , xN ), y = (y1, . . . , yN ) ∈ FNq . Their star
product is defined to be
x ? y = (x1y1, . . . , xNyN ) ∈ FNq
Now let C and D be length N linear codes over Fq . Their star
product C ? D is another linear code of length N , defined to
be
C ?D = spanFq{c ? d : c ∈ C, d ∈ D}.
Similarly, if G ≥ 1 is any positive integer, we define
C?G = C ? · · · ? C︸ ︷︷ ︸
G times
= spanFq{c1 ? · · · ? cG : cg ∈ C}.
Reed-Solomon codes are especially well-behaved with re-
spect to star products, since the star product of two evaluation
vectors is the evaluation vector of the product of the two
functions. The following proposition essentially appears in
4[8] and [12], but we include a proof here for the sake of
completeness.
Proposition 2. Let RSK(α) and RST (α) be Reed-Solomon
codes of length N with the same evaluation vector α. Then:
(i) RSK(α) ?RST (α) = RSmin{K+T−1,N}(α), and
(ii) RSK(α)?G = RSmin{G(K−1)+1,N}(α).
Proof. Let f, g ∈ Fq[z], where deg(f) < K and deg(g) < T .
Then deg(fg) < K+T −1, and hence RSK(α)?RST (α) ⊆
RSmin{K+T−1,N}(α). Conversely, every polynomial of de-
gree less than K+T−1 is a linear combination of polynomials
of the form fg, where deg(f) < K and deg(g) < T . This
suffices to prove part (i). Part (ii) is proved using part (i) and
an easy induction argument on G.
D. The Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
The perfect privacy guarantees in the sequel can be seen
as a special case of the Shamir secret sharing scheme [21].
By now a classic result, the Shamir secret sharing scheme
allows N parties to share L secrets, such that sets of at
most X parties cannot infer anything about the secrets, and
sets of at least X+L parties can reconstruct all L secrets. The
Shamir scheme relies on linear encoding of the following form.
Let s1, . . . , sL be the secrets, seen as column vectors over
a finite field. An external trusted party generates X random
column vectors t1, . . . , tX of the same length as the secrets,
performs linear encoding
[s1, . . . , sL, t1, . . . , tX ] ·
(
A
B
)
= (y1, . . . , yN ),
where A ∈ FL×Nq and B ∈ FX×Nq , and distributes the
shares y1, . . . , yN to the parties. The following lemma is well-
known, and will be most useful in the sequel.
Lemma 3. If B is an MDS matrix (i.e., if every X × X
submatrix of it is invertible), then
I(s1, . . . , sL; yn1 , . . . , ynX ) = 0
for every subset {n1, . . . , nX} ⊆ [N ].
E. Private Computation of Coded Data
We consider the problem of Private Computation on dis-
tributed storage systems of the following type; this follows
a standard setup in the PIR literature, see [2, 8, 26]. Let
x1, . . . , xK ∈ FM×1q , and let C be an [N,K] code over Fq
with generator matrix G ∈ FK×Nq . Define vectors yn ∈ FM×1q
for n = 1, . . . , N by
[y1 · · · yN ] = X ·G, where
X , [x1 · · · xK ] . (5)
The vector yn is stored on server n. We refer to C as the
storage code.
Given the above setup, a user wishes to compute φb(xk)
for some functions φ1, . . . , φB , for all k = 1, . . . ,K. We
assume that the functions φb all belong to some (necessarily
finite-dimensional) vector space S of functions FM×1q →
Fq . To accomplish this goal, the user sends S queries
ρ
(1)
n , . . . , ρ
(S)
n ∈ S to the n’th server, who responds with
the answers ρ(1)n (yn), . . . , ρ
(S)
n (yn). From all NS answers, the
user must be able to decode the desired function evaluations:
H({φb(xk)}|{ρ(s)n (yn)}) = 0.
It is useful to think of the above as happening over S rounds
or iterations, so that during the s’th round the user queries
the servers with the functions ρ(s)n and obtains the answers
ρ
(s)
n (yn). Similarly, it is useful to think of the parameter B as
analogous to the block length of a file in traditional PIR. We
view the parameters B and S as free for the user to adjust
to maximize their download rate. Here the terms φb(xk) are
random variables in the sense that the contents of the database
are, to the user, unknown and therefore best treated as random.
The terms ρ(s)n (yn) are random variables in the sense that
the queries ρ(s)n are sampled according to some distribution
employed by the user to preserve privacy. We forego making
this precise for the sake of readability.
Our primary function space of interest is S = PG = PM,G,
the space of polynomial functions of total degree at most G
from FM×1q to Fq . Thus we in general have φb, ρ
(s)
n ∈ PG,
for every b ∈ [B], n ∈ [N ], and s ∈ [S].
For any T -subset T = {n1, . . . , nT } of [N ], we let ρT
be the joint distribution of all ρ(s)n for all n ∈ T and all
s = 1, . . . , S. PC scheme has T -function-privacy if
I(φ1, . . . , φB ; ρT ) = 0
for all T -subsets {n1, . . . , nT } of [N ].
That is, a PC scheme has T -function-privacy if the identities
of the functions φ1, . . . , φB to be computed remain private
even after any T of the servers collude to attempt to deduce
the identities of the φb.
A PC scheme has E-data-privacy if
I(x1, . . . , xK ; yn1 , . . . , ynE ) = 0
for all E-subsets {n1, . . . , nE} of [N ].
That is, the servers in the distributed storage system remain
oblivious to the contents of the uncoded data, even if E of
them collude to attempt to deduce the identities of the xk.
A PC scheme is robust against P stragglers or unresponsive
servers if the user is still able to decode the values φb(xk) even
if, during any round of the scheme, up to P servers respond
with an erasure symbol ? instead of the true answer ρ(s)n (yn).
Similarly, a PC scheme is robust against A adversaries or
Byzantine servers if the user is still able to decode the values
φb(xk) even if, during any round of the scheme, up to A
servers respond with an arbitrary element of Fq instead of
the true answer ρ(s)n (yn). From a coding-theoretic perspective,
having P stragglers and A adversaries simply means that
during the s’th round, the user receives the total response
vector
(ρ
(s)
1 (y1), . . . , ρ
(s)
N (yN )) + 
(s)
where (s) is a vector containing at most P erasure symbols
? and at most A non-zero elements of Fq . Here the erasure
symbol is understood to be absorbing with respect to addition:
5q field size
K number of uncoded data vectors xk
M length of vectors xk
G degree of polynomial functions to be evaluated on the
xk
N number of servers
C [N,K] storage code
T number of colluding function-curious servers
E number of colluding data-curious servers
A number of adversaries / Byzantine servers
P number of stragglers / unresponsive servers
S number of rounds
B number of functions to be evaluated
R download rate of PC scheme
TABLE I
IMPORTANT PARAMETERS USED IN PRIVATE COMPUTATION SCHEMES.
x+? =? for all x ∈ Fq . See [3, 24, 27] for more on PIR from
systems with stragglers and adversaries.
Given a PC scheme, our principal metric of efficiency will
be the download rate, also referred to as the PC rate or simply
rate, which is defined to be
R =
KB
NS
. (6)
That is, the rate R is the number of desired function evalu-
ations φb(xk) the user obtains, divided by the total number
of function evaluations ρ(s)n (yn) downloaded. From a strict
Information-Theoretic point of view, it would be more correct
to define the rate to be
R =
H ({φb(xk)})∑N
n=1
∑S
s=1H
(
ρ
(s)
n (yn)
) , (7)
which better accounts for potential dependencies between the
variables φb(xk). If all φb(xk) are independent for all b, k, and
furthermore H(φb(xk)) = H(ρ
(s)
n (yn)) for all b, k, n, s, then
the two expressions in (6) and (7) for the rate coincide. This
is indeed the case given reasonable independence conditions
on the data vectors and the functions to be evaluated, but for
the sake of compactness and readability we will ignore these
subtleties and use (6) as our definition of rate.
Much of the current literature on PIR concerns itself with
establishing the capacity C of a given PIR setup. The capacity
of a PIR problem is defined to be the supremum of all possible
PIR rates. As the current work is only concerned with explicit
scheme constructions and not with establishing the capacity of
any PC setup, we will mostly ignore this notion in the sequel.
We aggregate all of the important parameters of our system
in Table I.
F. Private Information Retrieval as Private Computation and
a Remark on Upload Cost
The problem of Private Information Retrieval is a special
case of the problem of Private Computation described above.
Indeed, in PIR one typically supposes that the data matrix X
is composed of several row blocks xi ∈ FB×Kq , which are
the files of the system. Setting the functions φb to be the B
coordinate projections corresponding to the B coordinates of
some xi, we see that computing φb(xk) for all b = 1, . . . , B
and all k = 1, . . . ,K is equivalent to retrieving each row of xi,
that is, downloading the file xi. Since coordinate projections
have degree G = 1, any PC scheme for privately computing
polynomials of arbitrary degree G specifies to a PIR scheme
when we set G = 1 and choose the φb to all be distinct
coordinate projections.
In Private Information Retrieval, one typically justifies ig-
noring the upload cost of a PIR scheme by assuming that the
files xi have entries in some field extension K of Fq , while the
storage code C and queries ρ(s)n all remain defined over Fq .
Provided that [K : Fq]  0, the upload cost is dominated by
the download cost, which justifies using the download rate
as the sole performance metric. Generally, one can ignore
the extension field K as all important operations and analysis
occur over the base field Fq .
Similar considerations allow one to ignore the upload cost
in Private Computation. One can suppose that the data matrix
is defined over some large extension K of Fq , and that the
function space PG consists of polynomials with coefficients in
Fq itself. Communicating an arbitrary polynomial in PG costs∑G
i=0
(
M
i
)
elements of Fq , and therefore the user’s total upload
cost will be NS
∑G
i=0
(
M
i
)
. However, the total download cost
is easily seen to be NS · [K : Fq] many elements of Fq , and
therefore if K satisfies [K : Fq]
∑G
i=0
(
M
i
)
, one can ignore
the upload cost. We note that the upload cost increases very
quickly in G, and therefore in practice this inequality may be
satisfied only for small G.
Finally, we note that a simple relaxation of the privacy
requirement can drastically reduce the upload cost. Notice
that the expression NS
∑G
i=0
(
M
i
)
for upload cost stems
from the expression NS dimFq (PG), where dimFq (PG) is
the dimension of the set PG as a subspace over Fq . More
generally, in order to communicate a function in a sub-
space P ⊆ PG, where P is known to all, one only has to
communicate dimFq (P) field elements. Hence, one can deter-
mine any such subspace P , either a priori or by communicating
a sparse basis of it. Then, one can apply an identical scheme
in which φb ∈ P for every b ∈ [B]. The resulting privacy,
however, will be restricted to P , that is, the definition of T -
function privacy will be reduced to
I(φ1, . . . , φB |∀i ∈ [B], φi ∈ P; ρT |∀ni ∈ T , ρni ∈ T ) = 0
for all T -subsets {n1, . . . , nT } of [N ].
III. A GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
In this section we present the main Private Computation
scheme of the paper which applies for N > (G(K+E−1)+
T + P + 2A). With the system parameters as in Table I, the
PC scheme has rate
R =
N − (G(K + E − 1) + T + P + 2A)
N
·
K
G(K + E − 1) + 1 .
In what follows, we describe the data encoding procedure, then
present the scheme in broad strokes. In the third subsection,
6we present the scheme in detail, with an emphasis on the
presentation of the first two rounds of the scheme for the sake
of clarity. We show that the scheme has the stated rate, has
E-data privacy, has T -function privacy, and is robust against
any P stragglers and any A adversaries.
A. Data Encoding
Let us first describe the data encoding procedure, which
follows the Lagrange encoding of Reed-Solomon codes as in
Section II-B2. Let xk ∈ FMq for k = 1, . . . ,K be the K
data vectors, and let t1, . . . , tE ∈ FMq be E i.i.d. uniform
random vectors. Define X = [x1 · · · xK t1 · · · tE ]. Let β =
(β1, . . . , βK+E) ∈ FK+Eq consist of K +E distinct elements
of Fq . Define the interpolation polynomial uX(z) = uX,β(z)
by the property
uX(βk) = xk for k = 1, . . . ,K
uX(βK+e) = te for e = 1, . . . , E.
By basic facts about polynomial interpolation, we have
deg(uX(z)) ≤ K+E−1. Note that uX(z) is more accurately
described as a vector of polynomials of length M , that is,
uX(z) ∈ Fq[z]M . However, we continue to refer to it as a
polynomial for simplicity. We now choose an evaluation vector
α = (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ FNq where the αn are all distinct and
non-zero, and set
yn = uX(αn)
which is then stored on server n = 1, . . . , N . If we further
have {βk}k∈[K] ∩ {αn}n∈[N ] = ∅, then it is straightforward
to show using Lemma 3 that we have E-data privacy. See [32,
Section IV.C] for more details.
B. Basic Scheme Outline
To begin, define N ′ , N − (P + 2A), and let
H , N ′ − (G(K +E − 1) + T ), L , G(K +E − 1) + 1.
Define B and S to be positive integers satisfying the equation
BL = HS.
The exact choice of B and S is not of crucial importance,
so one can choose them to be minimal or simply set S = L
and B = H for simplicity, which are the minimal solutions
whenever gcd(L,H) = 1.
The scheme will evaluate φb(xk) for B functions φb ∈ PG.
This will be accomplished by downloading all coefficients of
γb(z) , φb(uX(z)), and then evaluating the γb(z) on the βk.
We have deg(γb(z)) ≤ G(K+E−1), and thus L is the number
of coefficients we need to download to completely determine
a single γb(z). As the individual coefficients of γb(z) will also
play a role in the scheme construction, we define γb` by
γb(z) =
L−1∑
`=0
γb`z
`
The parameter H is defined so that the user will download H
unique coefficients γb` during each round of the scheme.
We define some ζ(s)b (z) ∈ Fq[z, z−1] for b = 1, . . . , B and
s = 1, . . . , S, whose precise nature will be made clear in the
scheme construction. We also choose1 ψ(s)t ∈ PG to be i.i.d.
uniform random elements, which are chosen anew during each
round. Now set
ρ(s) =
B∑
b=1
ζ
(s)
b (z)φb + z
H
T∑
t=1
zt−1ψ(s)t
Given our evaluation points αn ∈ Fq , we construct query
functions ρ(s)n , for n = 1, . . . , N , the n’th of which is equal
to ρ(s) evaluated at z = αn. That is,
ρ(s)n ,
B∑
b=1
ζ
(s)
b (αn)φb + α
H
n
T∑
t=1
αt−1n ψ
(s)
t ∈ PG. (8)
Note that the coefficients ζ(s)b (αn) and α
H+t−1
n in (8) are
independent of the functions φb and ψ
(s)
t , and hence can be
computed a priori. Here ρ(s)n is transmitted to the n’th server
during the s’th round, who responds with ρ(s)n (yn). We define
the s’th response polynomial r(s)(z) ∈ Fq[z] to be
r(s)(z) , ρ(s)(uX(z))
=
B∑
b=1
ζ
(s)
b (z)φb(uX(z)) + z
H
T∑
t=1
zt−1ψ(s)t (uX(z))
=
B∑
b=1
ζ
(s)
b (z)γb(z) + z
Hδ(s)(z)
where we define δ(s)(z) ,
∑T
t=1 z
t−1ψ(s)t (uX(z)). Note that
zHδ(s)(z) ∈ span{zH , . . . , zH+G(K+E−1)+T−1}, (9)
and thus the evaluation vector of zHδ(s)(z), which contains
only randomness, lives in a subspace of FNq of dimension
G(K + E − 1) + T = N ′ −H .
During the s’th round, the user observes the vector
ev(r(s)(z)) + (s)
where (s) is a vector which contains at most P erasure sym-
bols, coming from the P stragglers, and at most A arbitrary
elements of Fq , coming from the A adversaries. During each
round, this will allow the user to decode the coefficients of
1, z, . . . , zH−1 in r(s)(z), which will come from the terms in∑B
b=1 ζ
(s)
b (z)γb(z). The general expression for r
(s)(z) will be
of the form
r(s)(z) = a
(s)
−Cz
−C + · · ·+ a(s)−1z−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(s)
i known from previous rounds
+ a
(s)
0 + · · ·+ a(s)H−1zH−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(s)
i decoded during s’th round
+ zHδ(s)(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
1As mentioned in Subsection II-F, one can restrict the attention to some
subspace P ⊆ PG to reduce upload costs, in which case we must have φb ∈
P for every b ∈ [B] and ψ(s)t ∈ P for every s and t. The resulting query
in (8) will be in P as a linear combination. The guaranteed privacy will be
restricted to P , i.e., an attacker will not be able to learn anything about the
functions φ1, . . . , φB other than them being in P .
7for some C which can depend on the round index s. The
assumption that αn 6= 0 for all n guarantees that ev(r(s)(z))
is a well-defined element of FNq . Strictly speaking, r(s)(z) is
not a polynomial as it will contain negative powers of z, but
the distinction is not relevant to the scheme construction, and
so we refer to it as a polynomial for simplicity.
During the s’th round, the decoding process roughly pro-
ceeds as follows. The user subtracts off the evaluation vectors
of a(s)−Cz
−C , . . . , a(s)−1z
−1 from what they receive, and are left
with an element of a Reed-Solomon code with parameters
[N,N ′, P+2A+1]. This allows them to correct the P erasures
and A errors in the vector (s). After this decoding, they
may obtain the elements a(s)0 , . . . , a
(s)
H−1 as the coefficients
of the evaluation vectors of 1, z, . . . , zH−1, which are linearly
independent from the evaluation vector of zHδ(s).
The scheme construction will guarantee that the sets A(s) =
{a(s)i | i = 0, . . . ,H−1} of coefficients decoded during round
s each consist of H unique coefficients of the polynomials
γb(z). That is, A(s) ∩ A(t) = ∅ for s 6= t, and since
each has size H , the user will have decoded HS = BL
unique coefficients of the B polynomials γb(z) at the end
of the scheme. Since this is all of the coefficients of these
polynomials, the user can reconstruct all γb(z) entirely, and
therefore compute
φb(xk) = φb(uX(βk)) = γb(βk)
for all b = 1, . . . , B and all k = 1, . . . ,K. The PC rate is
therefore
R =
KB
NS
=
N − (G(K + E − 1) + T + P + 2A)
N
·
K
G(K + E − 1) + 1
as claimed.
C. Construction of ζ(s)b (z) and Decoding
It remains to define the functions ζ(s)b (z) and describe the
decoding process. To begin, define the matrix
ζ(z) =
(
ζ
(s)
b (z)
)
1≤s≤S
1≤b≤B
∈ Fq[z, z−1]S×B
and let ζ(s)(z) be the s’th row of ζ(z). We start by defining
integers Q1 and U1 by using Euclidean division to write
H = Q1L+ U1, Q1 = bH/Lc and 0 ≤ U1 < L.
For the sake of presentation, we first define ζ(1)(z) and ζ(2)(z)
and demonstrate the decoding process during the first two
rounds of the scheme. We then give a recursive definition of
ζ
(s)
b (z) which works for every s = 2, . . . , S.
1) Round s = 1: Define ζ(1)(z) to be
ζ(1)(z) =
(
1 zL · · · z(Q1−1)L zQ1L 0 · · · 0)
or equivalently,
ζ
(1)
b (z) =
{
z(b−1)L 1 ≤ b ≤ Q1 + 1
0 Q1 + 2 ≤ b ≤ B
The response polynomial r(1)(z) is then of the form
r(1)(z) = γ1(z) + z
Lγ2(z) + · · ·+ z(Q1−1)LγQ1(z)+
zQ1LγQ1+1(z) + z
Hδ(1)(z)
First, note that
deg(zQ1LγQ1+1(z)) ≤ Q1L+G(K + E − 1)
≤ H +G(K + E − 1) ≤ N ′ − 1,
that alongside (9) implies that the evaluation vector of r(1)(z)
lives in RSN ′(α), which is an MDS code with parameters
[N,N ′, P + 2A + 1] and can thus correct P erasures and
A errors contained in the vector (s). After the erasure/error
correction, the user is left with the evaluation vector of r(1)(z),
which determines r(1)(z) completely. Since deg(γb(z)) ≤ L
for all b, the coefficients of 1, z, . . . , zH−1 of the above allow
the user to decode all of the coefficients of γ1(z), . . . , γQ1(z),
and the first U1 coefficients of γQ1+1(z). That is, A
(1) =
{γ10, . . . , γQ1+1,U1−1}.
2) Round s = 2: Let Q2 be the largest integer such that
−U1 + (Q2 −Q1)L ≤ H , and define ζ(2)(z) by
ζ
(2)
b (z) =

0 1 ≤ b ≤ Q1
z−U1+(b−(Q1+1))L Q1 + 1 ≤ b ≤ Q2 + 1
0 Q2 + 2 ≤ b ≤ B.
The response polynomial r(2)(z) is then of the form
r(2)(z) = z−U1γQ1+1(z) + z
−U1+LγQ1+2(z) + · · ·
+z−U1+(Q2−Q1)LγQ2+1(z) + z
Hδ(2)(z)
= γQ1+1,0z
−U1 + · · ·+ γQ1+1,U1−1z−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients known from round s = 1
+
γQ1+1,U1 + · · ·+ γQ2+1,0z−U1+(Q2−Q1)L+
· · ·+ γQ2+1,U2−1z−U1+(Q2−Q1)L+U2−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
H coefficients decoded during round s = 2
+ zHη(2)(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
,
where U2 is chosen so that −U1 + (Q2 − Q1)L + U2 −
1 = H − 1, that is, so that the first U2 coefficients of
γQ2+1(z) are downloaded during round 2. Here η
(2)(z) is a
polynomial which incorporates the noise polynomial δ(2)(z)
and the monomials of γQ2+1(z) whose coefficients are not
downloaded during the s’th round. One sees easily that
deg
(
z−U1+(Q2−Q1)LγQ2+1(z)
)
≤ H +G(K + E − 1)
≤ N ′ − 1
from which we see that deg(zHη(2)(z)) ≤ N ′ − 1 as well.
The coefficients γQ1+1,0, . . . , γQ1+1,U1−1 are exactly the
first U1 coefficients of γQ1(z), and are known to the user
from round s = 1. The user can therefore subtract the vectors
γQ1+1,0ev(z
−U1), . . . , γQ1+1,U1−1ev(z
−1) from the response
vector in round 2. After this subtraction, the user is left with
the vector
8ev
 γQ1+1,U1 + · · ·+γQ2+1,U2−1z−U1+(Q2−Q1)L+U2−1+
zHη(2)(z)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈RSN′ (α)
+(2)
where (2) contains P erasure symbols and A non-zero ele-
ments of Fq . Because RSN ′(α) is an MDS code with param-
eters [N,N ′, P +2A+1], the user can correct these erasures
and errors. After this erasure/error correction, the user further
decodes the coefficients A(2) = {γQ1+1,U1 , . . . , γQ2+1,U2−1}
as the coefficients of the evaluation vectors of 1, z, . . . , zH−1.
3) Round s = 2, . . . , S: We generalize the construction of
the ζ(2)b (z) to the following recursive construction of ζ
(s)
b for
all s = 2, . . . , S. Having already defined Us−1 and Qs−1, we
define Qs to be the maximal integer such that −Us−1+(Qs−
Qs−1)L ≤ H , and then set
ζ
(s)
b (z) =

0 1 ≤ b ≤ Qs−1
z−Us−1+(b−(Qs−1+1))L Qs−1 + 1 ≤ b ≤ Qs + 1
0 Qs + 2 ≤ b ≤ B.
Lastly, define Us by the equation −Us−1 + (Qs −Qs−1)L+
Us−1 = H−1. In round s−1, the user decoded the first Us−1
coefficients of γQs−1(z). The response polynomial r
(s)(z) can
therefore be written as
r(s)(z) = γQs−1,0z
−Us−1 + · · ·+ γQs−1,Us−1−1z−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients known from round s− 1
+γQs−1,Us−1 + · · ·+ γQs,0z−Us−1+(Qs−Qs−1)L+
· · ·+ γQs,Us−1z−Us−1+(Qs−Qs−1)L+Us−1+︸ ︷︷ ︸
H coefficients decoded during round s
zHη(s)(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
.
As in rounds s = 1, 2, the user first subtracts the vectors
corresponding to negative powers of z, the coefficients of
which have been decoded in round s−1. As in rounds s = 1, 2,
one shows easily that deg(zHη(s)(z)) ≤ N ′ − 1, hence
what is left after this subtraction is an element of RSN ′(α)
plus a vector (s) with P erasure symbols and A non-zero
elements of Fq . After performing erasure/error correction in
this Reed-Solomon code, the user may now decode the set
A(s) = {γQs−1,Us−1 , . . . , γQs,Us−1} as the coefficients of the
evaluation vectors of 1, z, . . . , zH−1. We see that during the
s’th round, the user obtains all coefficients of Qs − Qs−1
distinct polynomials γb(z), and Us coefficients of a single
additional polynomial.
After S rounds, the user has decoded all of the sets A(s)
for s = 1, . . . , S. Since they are all clearly disjoint and of
size H , the user has obtained HS = BL coefficients of the
γb(z), which suffices to reconstruct all of these polynomials.
The scheme construction is therefore complete.
D. Proof of T -function Privacy
Since a function in PG can be seen as a vector over Fq , it
follows from (8) that the query functions are of the following
form.

ρ
(s)
1
...
ρ
(s)
N

>
=

φ1
...
φB
ψ
(s)
1
...
ψ
(s)
T

>

ζ
(s)
1 (α1) . . . ζ
(s)
1 (αN )
...
. . .
...
ζ
(s)
B (α1) . . . ζ
(s)
B (αN )
αH1 . . . α
H
N
αH+11 . . . α
H+1
N
...
. . .
...
αH+T−11 . . . α
H+T−1
N

.
It is readily verified by Lemma 3 that
I(φ1, . . . , φB ; ρ
(s)
n1 , . . . , ρ
(s)
nT ) = 0 for any T -subset T
of [N ], and any single s = 1, . . . , S. Since the ψ(s)t are
chosen independently between rounds, the result follows.
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section we illustrate some of the subtleties of
the scheme construction through a detailed example for the
parameters N = 14, K = 2, G = 2, T = 1, P = 1, A = 1,
E = 2, which achieves a PC rate of
R =
N − (G(K + E − 1) + T + P + 2A)
N
·
K
G(K + E − 1) + 1 =
4
49
.
The auxiliary parameters are given by N ′ = 11, H = 4, L =
7, B = 4, and S = 7. The data encoding operates by choosing
two i.i.d. uniform random vectors t1, t2 and distinct elements
β1, . . . , β4 ∈ Fq , and defining the interpolating polynomial
uX(z) by the conditions
uX(β1) = x1, uX(β2) = x2, uX(β3) = t1, uX(β4) = t2.
We have deg(uX(z)) ≤ 3. Choosing some α1, . . . , α14 ∈ Fq
to all be non-zero and distinct from β1 and β2, we encode by
setting yn = uX(αn) for all n = 1, . . . , 14.
The scheme will compute, over S = 7 rounds, the func-
tion values φb(xk) for B = 4 quadratic functions φb. The
polynomials γb(z) = φb(uX(z)) whose coefficients will be
downloaded have degree deg(γb(z)) ≤ 6, and hence are each
completely determined by L = 7 coefficients.
The query functions ρ(s)n take the form
ρ(s)n =
B∑
b=1
ζ
(s)
b (αn)φb + α
4
nψ
(s)
1
where ψ(s)1 is a uniform random element of P2. The functions
ζ
(s)
b (z) are given by
ζ(z) =
(
ζ
(s)
b (z)
)
1≤s≤7
1≤b≤4
=

1 0 0 0
z−4 z3 0 0
0 z−1 0 0
0 z−5 z2 0
0 0 z−2 0
0 0 z−6 z
0 0 0 z−3

9from which we can compute the response polynomials r(s)(z)
to be
r(1)(z) = γ10 + γ11z + γ12z
2 + γ13z
3 + z4η(1)(z)
r(2)(z) = γ10z
−4 + γ11z−3 + γ12z−2 + γ13z−1 + γ14+
γ15z + γ16z
2 + γ20z
3 + z4η(2)(z)
r(3)(z) = γ20z
−1 + γ21 + γ22z + γ23z2+
γ24z
3 + z4η(2)(z)
r(4)(z) = γ20z
−5 + γ21z−4 + γ22z−3 + γ23z−2+
γ24z
−1 + γ25 + γ26z + γ30z2+
γ31z
3 + z4η(4)(z)
r(5)(z) = γ30z
−2 + γ31z−1 + γ32 + γ33z + γ34z2+
γ35z
3 + z4η(5)(z)
r(6)(z) = γ30z
−6 + γ31z−5 + γ32z−4 + γ33z−3+
γ34z
−2 + γ35z−1 + γ36 + γ40z + γ41z2+
γ42z
3 + z4η(6)(z)
r(7)(z) = γ40z
−3 + γ41z−2 + γ42z−1 + γ43 + γ44z+
γ45z
2 + γ46z
3 + z4η(7)(z)
In the first round, the polynomial r(1)(z) has degree ≤ N ′ −
1 = 10, hence its evaluation vector lives in a Reed-Solomon
code with parameters [14, 11, 4], allowing the user to correct
the erasure and error from the straggler and adversary. The
user then decodes γ10, . . . , γ13. In all successive rounds, it
is clear from the above expressions that all coefficients of
negative powers of z are decoded in previous rounds, and
can thus be subtracted from the response vector. After this
subtraction, what is left is in a Reed-Solomon code with
parameters [14, 11, 4], which can correct P = 1 erasure and
A = 1 error. The user performs this erasure/error correction,
and then decodes the coefficients of 1, z, z2, z3 in every round.
Having decoded all γb` for b = 1, . . . , 4 and ` = 0, . . . , 6,
the user can compute φb(xk) = γb(βk) for b = 1, . . . , 4 and
k = 1, 2. The user has computed KB = 8 function evaluations
while downloading NS = 98 elements of Fq total, hence the
rate of the scheme is
R =
KB
NS
=
8
98
=
4
49
as claimed.
V. IMPROVED PC RATE FOR SYSTEMATIC ENCODING
In this section it is shown that whenever P = A = E = 0
and N ≤ 2G(K − 1) + T + 1, a larger PC rate is achievable
by systematic encoding. The choice of the specific systematic
code is not important, so one can simply assume that the data is
encoded with systematic Lagrange encoding (i.e., where βi =
αi for all i ∈ [K] in (4)). The scheme in this section appeared
in [12].
First, let the storage code be C = RSK(α). Define D =
RST (α), called the retrieval code of the scheme, and let E ,
C?G ?D. It follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 that E =
RSG(K−1)+T (α). Denote the minimum distance of E by DE ,
and let F , DE −1 = N −G(K−1)−T . Next, let B and S
be the minimal integers that satisfy min{F,K}S = KB (i.e.,
S = lcm(K,min{F,K})min{F,K} and B =
lcm(K,min{F,K})
K ), and choose
subsets of [K] –
I(1) = I(1,1) ∪ I(1,2) ∪ . . . ∪ I(1,B)
I(2) = I(2,1) ∪ I(2,2) ∪ . . . ∪ I(2,B)
...
I(S) = I(S,1) ∪ I(S,2) ∪ . . . ∪ I(S,B), (10)
such that in each row the sets in the union are pairwise disjoint,
such that |I(s)| = min{F,K} for every s ∈ [S], and such that
for every b ∈ [B] we have that ∪Ss=1I(s,b) = [K]. The process
of choosing the sets {I(s,b)}(s,b)∈[S]×[B] in (10) is very simple,
and similar constructions have appeared in [8, 12]. For our
current purposes, the choice of these sets is best illustrated by
the following example.
Example 4. Assume that F = 4 and K = 6, which implies
that S = 3 and B = 2. Consider the following matrix1 1 1 12 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
 ,
which naturally corresponds to the sets
I(1,1) = {1, 2, 3, 4} I(1,2) = ∅
I(2,1) = {5, 6} I(2,2) = {1, 2}
I(3,1) = ∅ I(3,2) = {3, 4, 5, 6}.
One verifies immediately that the sets {I(s,b)}(s,b)∈[S]×[B]
have the stated properties.
To continue with the scheme construction, let Q be the
dimension of PG, and fix a basis ψ1, . . . , ψQ of PG. In
round s ∈ [S], the user employs fresh randomness in order
to choose codewords d1, . . . ,dQ ∈ D, and defines
ψn = d1(n) · ψ1 + · · ·+ dQ(n) · ψQ (11)
for every n ∈ [N ], where di(n) is the n’th entry of di. Then,
the user defines the queries
ρ(s)n =
{
ψn + φb
if there exists b∈[B]
such that n∈I(s,b)
ψn else
.
Intuitively, the set I(s) ⊆ [N ] contains the indices of the yi’s
for which some φb(yi), b ∈ [B] is retrieved during the s’th
round. In addition, for every b ∈ [B], the set I(s,b) contains
the indices of the yi’s such that φb(yi) is retrieved during
the s’th round; formally, we have that
I(s,b) , {t ∈ [N ] | φb(yt) is retrieved in round s}.
The T -function-privacy relies on the following lemma,
analogues of which were fully proved in [12, Theorem 1] and
in [8, Theorem 8], among others.
Lemma 5. If D is an MDS code then the scheme is T -function-
private.
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In turn, the response vector is of the form
ρ(s)(Y) = [ψ1(y1), . . . , ψN (yN )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ψ(Y)
+ v(s), (12)
where
(v(s))n =
{
φb(xn) if there exists b∈[B]such that n∈I(s,b)
0 else
,
and notice that φ(yn) = φb(xn) merely since I(s) ⊆ [K], and
since the encoding is systematic.
Lemma 6. The codeword ψ(Y) , [ψ1(y1), . . . , ψN (yN )] is
in E .
Proof. According to (11), one can readily verify that
[ψ1(y1), . . . , ψN (yn)] = Q∑
j=1
dj(1) · ψj(y1), . . . ,
Q∑
j=1
dj(N) · ψj(yN )

=
Q∑
j=1
[
dj(1) · ψj(y1), . . . ,dj(N) · ψj(yN )
]
=
Q∑
j=1
[ψj(y1), . . . , ψ
j(yN )] ? d
j ,
and hence it remains to prove that [ψj(y1), . . . , ψj(yN )] ∈
C?G for every j ∈ [Q]. To this end, assume that the
chosen basis ψ1, . . . , ψQ consists only of monomials, and
let ψj = Xa11 X
a2
2 · · ·XaMM for some j ∈ [Q]. Denot-
ing yn , [yn,1, yn,2, . . . , yn,M ] for every n ∈ [N ], which
implies that [y1,m, y2,m, . . . , yN,m] ∈ C for every m ∈ [M ],
implies that
[ψj(y1), . . . ,ψ
j(yN )] =[
M∏
m=1
yam1,m,
M∏
m=1
yam2,m, . . . ,
M∏
m=1
yamN,m
]
= [y1,1, y2,1, . . . , yN,1]
?a1 ? . . . ?
[y1,M , y2,M , . . . , yN,M ]
?aM
∈ C?a1 ? . . . ? C?aM ⊆ C?G.
Since ψ(Y) is a codeword in E , and since the Hamming
weight of v(s) is at most |I(s)| ≤ F = DE − 1, it follows
that the vector v(s) can be extracted from ρ(s)(Y) by an
error correction algorithm for E . Therefore, according to the
definition of the sets {I(s,b)}(s,b)∈[S]×[B], it follows that the
user can retrieve {φb(xk)}(k,b)∈[K]×[B], which concludes the
correctness of the scheme, whose PC rate is
KB
NS
=
min{F,K}
N
. (13)
Recall that for the parameters P = A = E = 0, the PC rate
of the general scheme (1) is
N −G(K − 1)− T
N
· K
G(K − 1) + 1 . (14)
Fig. 1. Asymptotic comparison of PC rates for various values of α = K/N
between the general scheme (Subsection III) and the systematic one (Subsec-
tion V) for G = 2 and β = T/N = 0.05.
Therefore, in order to compare (13) with (14), notice that
if N > 2G(K − 1) + T + 1, then since G ≥ 1, it follows
that
F ≥ G(K − 1) + 1 ≥ K, (15)
and thus (13) reduces to K/N . Moreover, (15) also implies
that
F
N
· K
G(K − 1) + 1 ≥
K
N
,
and hence for this parameter regime we have that (14) is
superior to (13). Conversely, if N ≤ 2G(K − 1) + T + 1,
then F ≤ G(K − 1) + 1, and therefore
F
N
· K
G(K − 1) + 1 ≤
K
N
.
Also, since K ≤ G(K − 1) + 1, we have that
F
N
· K
G(K − 1) + 1 ≤
F
N
,
and hence
F
N
· K
G(K − 1) + 1 ≤
min{F,K}
N
,
which implies the superiority of the systematic scheme
for N ≤ 2G(K − 1) + T + 1.
To compare (13) and (14) asymptotically, assume that N,K,
and T approach infinity, and yet α , K/N and β , T/N
remain constants. The resulting PC rates are 1−βG − α for the
general scheme, and min{1− αG− β, α} for the systematic
one, and the necessary condition N ≥ G(K − 1) + T + 1
translates to αG+β ≤ 1. An example for G = 2 and β = 0.05
is given in Figure 1.
VI. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we leveraged a recent notion from coded
computing and obtained a robust private computing scheme for
computing polynomials of arbitrary degree on encoded data,
that can also guarantee privacy of the data. The scheme also
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accounts for servers which are stragglers or adversaries, and
is robust against servers colluding to attempt to deduce the
identity of the functions to be evaluated. Many open questions
remain, the most prominent of which is the capacity question,
i.e., constructing schemes for this scenario with provably
optimal rate. However, as mentioned in Section I, the capacity
question of PIR is largely open, even without extending its
scope to private computation. Thus, proving optimality is
likely to be very difficult, even in restricted cases where some
of the system parameters are zero. Another possible research
direction is coming up with a proper notion of perfect privacy
for real-valued computations, which applies directly without
embedding into a finite field.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The first author would like to thank Prof. Jehoshua Bruck
for many helpful discussions. The second author would like
to thank Razane Tajeddine and Oliver Gnilke for constructive
and helpful conversations regarding the results of the current
work.
REFERENCES
[1] M. A. Attia and R. Tandon, “Approximately Optimal Dis-
tributed Data Shuffling,” IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 721–725, 2018.
[2] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “The Capacity of Private
Information Retrieval From Coded Databases,” in IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 3,
pp. 1945–1956, 2018.
[3] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “The Capacity of Private
Information Retrieval from Byzantine and Colluding
Databases,” in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 1206–1219, 2018.
[4] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan.
“Private Information Retrieval,” Journal of the ACM,
vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 965–981, 1998.
[5] J. Chung, K. Lee, R. Pedarsani, D. Papailiopoulos,
and K. Ramchandran, “UberShuffle: Communication-
efficient Data Shuffling for SGD via Coding Theory,”
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NIPS), 2017.
[6] R. G.L. D’Oliveira, S. El Rouayheb, “One-Shot PIR: Re-
finement and Lifting,” arxiv:1810.05719, [cs.IT], 2018.
[7] S. Dutta, V. Cadambe, and P. Grover, “Short-dot: Com-
puting large linear transforms distributedly using coded
short dot products,” Advances In Neural Information
Processing Systems (NIPS), pp. 2100–2108, 2016.
[8] R. Freij-Hollanti, O. W. Gnilke, C. Hollanti, and
D. Karpuk, “Private Information Retrieval from Coded
Databases with Colluding Servers,” in SIAM Journal on
Applied Algebra and Geometry, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 647–
664, Nov. 2017.
[9] R. Freij-Hollanti, O. W. Gnilke, C. Hollanti,
A. Horlemann-Trautmann, D. Karpuk and I. Kubjas, “t-
Private Information Retrieval Schemes Using Transitive
Codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, to
appear.
[10] W. Gasarch. “A Survey on Private Information Retrieval,”
Bulletin of the EATCS, 2004.
[11] Z. Jia, H. Sun, and S. A. Jafar, “Cross Subspace
Alignment and the Asymptotic Capacity of X-Secure
T -Private Information Retrieval,” arXiv:1808.07457,
[cs.IT], 2018.
[12] D. Karpuk, “Private Computation of Systematically En-
coded Data with Colluding Servers,” IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 2112–
2116, 2018.
[13] S. Kumar, H.-Y. Lin, E. Rosnes, A. Graell i Amat,
“Achieving Maximum Distance Separable Private In-
formation Retrieval Capacity With Linear Codes,”
arxiv:1712.03898, 2018.
[14] S. Li, M. A. Maddah-Ali, Q. Yu, A. S. Avestimehr,
“A Fundamental Tradeoff Between Computation and
Communication in Distributed Computing,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 109–
128, 2018.
[15] S. Li, S. M. M. Kalan, A. S. Avestimehr, and
M. Soltanolkotabi, “Near-Optimal Straggler Mitigation
for Distributed Gradient Methods,” IEEE International
Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Work-
shops (IPDPSW), pp. 857–866, 2018.
[16] M. Mirmohseni, M. A. Maddah-Ali, “Private Function
Retrieval,” arXiv:1711.04677, [cs.IT], 2018.
[17] S. A. Obead and J. Kliewer, “Achievable Rate of Private
Function Retrieval from MDS Coded Databases,” IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT),
pp. 2117–2121, 2018.
[18] S. A. Obead, H.-Y. Lin, E. Rosnes, J. Kliewer, “Capacity
of Private Linear Computation for Coded Databases”,
arxiv:1810.04230, [cs.IT], 2018.
[19] R. Ostrovsky and W. E. Skeith, “A Survey of Single-
Database Private Information Retrieval: Techniques and
applications,” International Workshop on Public Key
Cryptography, pp. 393–411, 2007.
[20] N. Raviv, I. Tamo, R. Tandon, and A. G. Dimakis,
“Gradient Coding from Cyclic MDS Codes and Expander
Graphs,” International Conference on Machine Learning
(ICML), 2018.
[21] A. Shamir, “How to Share a Secret,” Communications of
the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
[22] J. So, B. Guler, A. S. Avestimehr, and P. Mohassel, “Cod-
edPrivateML: A Fast and Privacy-Preserving Framework
for Distributed Machine Learning,” arXiv:1902.00641,
2019.
[23] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The Capacity of Private Infor-
mation Retrieval,” in IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 4075–4088, 2017.
[24] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The Capacity of Robust Pri-
vate Information Retrieval With Colluding Databases,”
in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64,
no. 4, pp. 2361–2370, 2018.
[25] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The Capacity of Private Com-
putation,” arXiv:1710.11098, 2017.
[26] R. Tajeddine, O. W. Gnilke and S. El Rouayheb, “Pri-
vate Information Retrieval From MDS Coded Data in
12
Distributed Storage Systems,” in IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 11, pp. 7081–7093,
2018.
[27] R. Tajeddine, O. W. Gnilke, D. Karpuk, R. Freij-Hollanti,
and C. Hollanti, “Private Information Retrieval from
Coded Storage Systems with Colluding, Byzantine, and
Unresponsive Servers,” arXiv:1806.08006, [cs.IT], 2018.
[28] R. Tandon, Q. Lei, A. G. Dimakis, and N. Karam-
patziakis, “Gradient Coding: Avoiding Stragglers in Dis-
tributed Learning,” International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML), pp. 3368–3376, 2017.
[29] S. Yekhanin. “Private Information Retrieval,” Communi-
cations of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 68–73, 2010.
[30] S. Yekhanin, “Locally Decodable Codes and Private
Information Retrieval Schemes,” PhD thesis (MIT), 2007.
[31] Q. Yu, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Poly-
nomial codes: an Optimal Design for High-Dimensional
Coded Matrix Multiplication,” Advances in Neural In-
formation Processing Systems (NIPS), pp. 4403–4413,
2017.
[32] Q. Yu, N. Raviv, J. So, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Lagrange
Coded Computing: Optimal Design for Resiliency, Secu-
rity and Privacy,” arXiv:1806.00939, 2018.
